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A FURTHER LEGAL INQUIRY INTO
RENEGOTIATION: II*
Charles W. Steadman

t

CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

Several issues concerning constitutionality of the Renegotiation
Act were discussed in a previous article.196 That prior inquiry was, of
course, not complete, nor is it possible here to exhaust all of these
problems. The changes which the Revenue Act of 1943 made in renegotiation together with the manifest importance of this subject and
the national interest which has been created by the challenges made
concerning its constitutionality warrant further inquiry into this phase
of the act. The issues of delegation of legislative authority, impairment
of contracts, due process and judicial review, as well as the nature of
renegotiation as a price regulating measure will be examined.
Delegation of Legislati'T.Je Authority and Standards of the Act
Article I, section 1 of the Constitution vests the power to legislate
in Congress. In the sense that the Constitution intends "the legislative
function consists of the power to make policy and the power to make
detail." 196 Congress must declare the policy; but it may delegate the
power to make the detail, if in so doing it defines '.'the circumstances
when its announced policy is to be declared operative and the method

* The

first installment of this article appeared in the August issue, 43 M1cH. L.
(1944).
.
Any opinions set forth in this article are those of the author and are not official
expressions of the War Department.
Major, Ordnance Department; Chief of the Legal Division of the War Department, Cleveland Ordnance District, since 1940. A.B., University of Nebraska;LL.B.,
Harvard.
195
Steadman, "Legal Aspects of Renegotiation," 42 MICH. L. REv. 545 at 5 52
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by wfilch it is to be effectuated." 191 To put this another way, if Congress declares an intelligible policy it- may give the authority to carry
out that policy to administrative bodies, if it also provides them with
adequate guides and standards by which to govern their acts in making
the policy effective. Applying these tests to the Renegotiation Act we
find that Congress has enunciated a clear policy against the realization
of exorbitant profits from contracts held directly or indirectly with the
war agencies. This policy is apparent in both the I 942 and the I 943
Acts. The issue is whether the standards are sufficiently clear and the
methods for carrying out this policy well enough defined to meet the
constitutional criteria.
- The I 942 Act tells the secretaries that they may determine through
renegotiation what are excessive profits but in so doing they must
consider certain factors. Standards are set up directing the allowance
or disallowance of certain deductions, excessive salaries and costs and
the kind of contracts which are to be renegotiated. The area within
which the law is to operate is clearly defined, but aside from these
factors the renegotiating agencies are not given much additional direction by the I 942 Act as to the method to be followed in determining
excessive profits. The 1943 Act, however, goes much further. In
addition to the standards established for the guidance of the administrators in the I 942 Act, an extensive criteria was adopted which must
be considered in the determination of excessive profits. 198 The term,
profits derived from contracts with the departments and subcontracts,
is defined to be "the excess of the amount received or accrued under
such contracts and: subcontracts over the costs paid or incurred with
respect thereto." 199 The administrators of the act are directed to determine these costs from the books of the contractor except that where the
contractor's accounting system is not adequate to reflect properly costs
and allowances and deductions, they shall be as estimated to be allowable by chapters I and 2E of the Internal Revenue Code.200
These factors appear as a certain enough definition of the circumstances in which the policy against the realization of inordinate profits
shall operate and the ways in which this policy shall be effectuated.
This writer suggested in a previous article that under the present con197 Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503 at 514, 64 S. Ct. 641 (1944); Opp
Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Adm.inistrator, 312 U.S. 126.at pp. 144, 657, 61 S. Ct. 524
(1941).
198
Subsection (a) (4) (A) of the 1943 Act.
199
Subsection (a) (4) (B) of the 1943 Act.
200
Ibid.
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cepts of delegated legislative authority the I 942 Act contains an enunciation of intelligible policy and principles which constitute adequate
guides and standards for the administrative agencies.20'- The 1943 Act
is an a fortiori case. Since that article was written the Supreme Court
has decided three cases which are of the greatest significance in the
consideration of this problem. If any doubt may exist as to the constitutionality of renegotiation with respect to the delegation of congressional authority without sufficient legislative guides and standards,
such as was held in Schecter Poultry Corporation v. United States 202
and Panama Refining v. Ryan,208 all such doubts should be dispelled by
the cases of Bowles v. Willingham, 20' Yakus v. United States,205 and
Rottenberg v. United States,206 in which the Supreme Court decided
the Emergency Price Control Act of r 942 201 to be constitutional.
Bowles v. Willingham, 208 Yakus v. United States 209 and its companion case, Rottenberg v. United States,210 have at least for wartime
laid the Schecter case gently to rest. In Bowles v. Willingham, Mrs.
Willingham had brought a suit in the Georgia court to restrain the
issuance of certain rent orders which the administrator proposed to
issue under the Emergency Price Control Act of r 942. The issuance
of these orders was challenged on the ground that the statute was
unconstitutional. The state court issued a temporary injunction with a
"show cause" order. The administrator then brought action in the
federal district court to restrain the further prosecution of the state
proceedings and the violation of the act. The administrator's suit was
dismissed by the district court which held the act unconstitutional and
there was a direct appeal to the Supreme Court.
Section 2 (b) of the act provides, among other things, that:
"Whenever in the judgment of the Administrator such action
is necessary or proper in order to effectuate the purposes of this
201

Steadman, "Legal Aspects of Renegotiation," 42 M1cH. L. REV. 545 at 566
.
202
295 U.S. 495, 55 S. Ct. 837 (1935).
208
293 U.S. 388, 55 S. Ct. 241 (1935).
20
' 321 U.S. 503 (1944).
205
321 U.S. 414 (1944).
20s 321 U.S. 414 (1944).
207
56 Stat. L. 23, 50 U.S.C. (1940), (Supp. III) App. § 901 et seq., 50 U.S.
C.A. (1943 Supp.) § 901 et seq., as amended by the Inflation Control Act of October
1942, 56 Stat. L. 765, 50 U.S.C. (1940) (Supp. Ill) App.§ 961 et seq., 50 U.S.C.A.
(1943 Supp.) § 961 et seq.
208
See note 204 supra.
209
See note 205 supra.
210
See note 206 supra.
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Act,· he shall issue a declaration setting forth the necessity for,
and recommendations with reference to, the stabilization or r.eduction of rents for any defense-area housing accommodations within
a particular defense rental area."
On April 28, 1942, the administrator had issued a declaration which
designated certain areas as "defense-rental areas" including that area
in which the defendant held property, and the order stated that it was
necessary to reduce and stabilize certain rents in order to effectuate the
purposes of the act. It recommended that pursuant to section 2(b) of
the act the maximum rent for housing accommodations should be that
which existed on April 1, 1941, and, where accommodations were not
rented as of April 1, 1941 or were constructed thereafter, the rent
should be in principle no greater than th,e generally prevailing rents.
in the particular area on April_ 1, 1941.
Section 2 (b) of the act also provides that:
" ... if within sixty days after the issuance of any such recommendations rents for any such accommodations within such defense-rental area have not in the judgment of the Administrator
been stabilized or reduced by State or local regulation, or otherwise, in accordance with the recommendations, the Administrator
may by regulation or order establish such maximum rent or maximum rents for such accommodations as in his judgment will be
generally fair and equitable and will effectuate the purposes of
· this Act. So for as practicable, in establishing any maximum rent
for any defense-area housing accommodations, the Administrator
shall ascertain and give due consideration to the rents prevailing
for such accommodations, or comparable accommodations, on or
about April 1, 1941 (or if, prior or subsequent to April 1, 1941,
defense activities shall have resulted or threatened to result in
increases in rents for housing accommodations in such area inconsistent with the purposes of this Act, then on or about a date ( not
earlier than April 1, 1940), which in the judgment of the Administrator, does not reflect such increases), and he shall make
adjustments for such relevant factors as he may determine and
deem to be of general applicability in respect of such accommodations, including increases or decreases in property taxes and other
costs. In designating defense-rental areas, in prescribing regulations and orders establishing maximum rents for such accommodations, and in selecting persons to administer such regulations and
orders, the Administrator shall, to such extent as he determines to
be practicable, consider any recommendations which may be made
by State and local officials concerned with housing or rental conditions in any defense-rental area."
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Pursuant to this section of the act the administrator issued a Maximum
Rent Regulation effective July I, 1942 which established the maximum
legal rents for housing in given areas.
The defendant received notice from the rent director in June, I943
that he proposed to· decrease the maximum rent for three apartments
owned by her, not rented on April I, I94I but first rented in the summer of I 94I, for the reason that the first rents received for these
apartments were in excess of those generally prevailing in the area
for comparable accommodations on April I, 1941. The defendant
objected. She was advised that the rent director would proceed to
issue the order and she brought suit in the Georgia court.
Passing the question presented to the Court as to whether the
litigant must follow the procedure and resort to the tribunal established by the act for a determination of her case, the issues presented
in this case and its companion case, Yakus v. United States, supra, are
directlY. in point in this inquiry. In contending that the act was unconstitutional one of the chief arguments relied upon by the defendant
was that there had been an improper delegation of the legislative function without proper standards and criteria. The Court in holding the
act to be constitutional decided that it was not an undue delegation of
legislative authority; that the policy was clearly enunciated ~nd sufficient standards had been established by Congress for the administrator's
actions. 211 Mr. Justice Douglas delivered the opinion of the Court
(pp. 512-513):
211

321 U.S. 503 (1944). Mr. Justice Roberts dissented saying (pp. 537-538):
"Without further elaboration it is plain that this Act creates personal government
by a petty tyront instead of government by law. Whether there shall be a law prescribing maximum rents anywhere in the United States depends solely on the Administrator's personal judgment. When that law shall take effect, how long it shall
remain in force, whether it shall be modified, what territory it shall cover, whether
different areas shall be subject to different regulations, what is the nature of the
activity that shall motivate the institution of the law,-all these matters are buried in
the bosom of the Administrator and nowhere else.
"I am far from urging that, in the present war emergency, rents and prices shall
not be controlled and stabilized. But I do insist that, war or no war, there exists no
necessity, and no constitutional power, for Congress' abdication of its legislative power
and remission to an executive official of the function of making and repealing laws
applicable to the citizens of the United States. No truer word was ever said than this
court's statement in the Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium Case [Home Bldg. & Lofm
Assn. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 425, 426, 54 S. Ct. 231, 235, 78 L. Ed. 413, 88A.L.R. 148 I] that emergency does· not create power but may furnish the occasion for
its exercise. The Constitution no more contemplates the elimination of any of the
coordinate branches of the Government during war than in peace. It will not do to
say that no other method could have been adopted consonant with the legislative power
of Congress. 'Defense-rental areas' and 'defense activities' could have been reasonably
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"When it came to rents Congress pursued the policy it adopted
respecting commodity prices. It established standards for administrative action and left with the Administrator the decision when
the rent controls of the Act should b~ invoked. He is empowered
to fix maximum rents for housing accommodations in any defenserental area, whenever in his judgment that action is necessary or
proper in order to effectuate the purposes of the Act. A defenserental area is any area 'designated by the Administrator as an area
where defense activities have resulted or threaten to result in an.
increase in the rents for housing accommodations inconsistent with
the purposes' of the Act. . . . The controls adopted by .Congress
were thought necessary 'in the interest of the national defense and
security' and for the 'effective prosecution of the present war.' ...
They have as their aim the effective protecdon of our price structures against the forces of disorganization and the pressures created by war and its attendant activities. Sec. r (a); S. Rep. No.
93r, 77th Cong. 2d Sess. pp. r-5. Thus the policy of the Act is
clear. The maximum rents fixed by the Administrator are those
which 'in his judgment' will be 'generally fair and equitable and
will effectuate the purposes of this Act.' Sec. 2 (b). But Congress
did not leave the Administrator with that general standard; it
supplied criteria for its application by stating th~t so far as practicable the Administrator in establishing any maximum rent should
ascertain and give consideration to the rents prevailing for the
acc9mmodations, or comparable ones, on April r, r94r. The Administrator, however, may choose an earlier or later date if defense
activities have caused increased rents prior or subsequent to April
r, r94r. But in no event may the Administrator select a date earlier
than April r, r940. And in determining a maximum rent 'he shall
make adjustments for such relevant factors as he may determine
and deem to be of general appl~cability in respect of such accommodations, including increases or decreases in property taxes and
other costs.' Sec. z(b ). And Congress has provided that the Administrator 'may provide for such adjustments and reasonable
exceptions' as in his judgment are 'necessary or proper in order to
effectuate the purposes of this Act.' Sec. 2 ( c).
defined. Rents in those areas could have been frozen as of a given date, or reasonably
precise standards could have been fixed, and administrative or other tribunals could
have been given power according to the rules and standards prescribed to deal with
special situations after hearing and findings and exposition of the reasons for action. I
say this only because the argument has been made that the emergency was such that no
other form of legislation would have served the end in view. It is not for this court
to tell Congress what sort of legislation it shall adopt, but in this instan_ce, when Congress seems to have abdicated and to have eliminated the legislative process from our
constitutional form of Government, it must be stated that this cannot be done uuless
the people so command or permit by amending the fundamental law." (Italics supplied).

1944]

RENEGOTIATION

241

"The considerations which support the delegation of authority
under this Act over commodity prices (Yakus v. United States)
are equally applicable here. The power to legislate which the
Constitution says 'shall be vested' in Congress (Art. I, Sec. 1)
has not been granted to the Aclministrator. Congress in § 1 (a) of
the Act has made clear its policy of waging war on inflation. In
§ 2 (b) it has defined the circumstances when its announced policy
is to be declared operative and the method by which it is to be
effectuated. Those steps constitute the performance of the legislative function in the constitutional sense. Opp Cotton Mills, Inc.
v. Administrator, 312 U.S. 126, 144, 657, 61 S. Ct. 524,532, 85
L. Ed. 624."
This ~ecision rests largely upon the recognition that in governing
a complex society congressional powers under the Constitution can
only be made to operate effectively and practically through considerable
delegation of authority to administrative agencies. In dealing with
this question of delegation the Court adopted the position that it took 212
in Opp Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Administrators:218
212
"There is no grant of unbridled administrative discretion as appellee argues.
Congress has not told the Administrator to fix rents whenever and wherever he might
like and at whatever levels he pleases. Congress has directed that maximum rents be
fixed in ,those areas where defense activities have resulted or threaten to result in
increased rentals inconsistent with the purpose of the Act. And it has supplied the
standard and the base period to guide the Administrator in determining what the
maximum rentals should be in a given area. The criteria to guide the Administrator
are certainly not more vague than the standards governing the determination by the
Secretary of Agriculture in United States o. Rock Royal Cooperative, Inc., 307 U.S.
533,576, 577, 59 S. Ct. 993, 1014, 83 L. Ed. 1446, of marketing areas and minimum
prices for milk. The question of how far Congress should go in filling in the details
of the standards which its administrative agency is to apply raises large issues of policy.
Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 398, 60 S. Ct. 907, 914, 84
L. Ed. 1263. We recently stated in connection with this problem of delegation, 'The
Constitution, viewed as a continuously operative charter of Government, is not to be
interpreted as demanding the impossible or the impracticable.' Opp Cotton Mills, Inc.
v. Administrator, supra, page 145, 61 S. Ct. page 533, 85 L. Ed. 624. In terms of
hard-headed practicalities Congress frequently could not perform its functions if it were
required to make an appraisal of the myriad of facts applicable to varying situations,
area by area throughout the land, and then to determine in each case what should be
done. Congress does not abdicate its functions when it describes what job must be
done, who must do it, and what is the scope of his authority. In our complex economy
that indeed is frequently the only way in which the legislative process can go forward.
Whether a particular grant of authority to an officer or agency is wise or unwise, raises
questions which are none of our concern. Our inquiry ends with the constitutional
issue. Congress here has specified the basic conclusions of fact upon the ascertainment
of which by the Administrator its statutory command is to become effective." Bowles
v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503 at 514-515 (1944).
213
312 U.S. 126 at 145, 61 S. Ct. 524 (1941).
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"The Constitution, viewed as a continuously operative charter of Government, is not ,to be interpreted as demanding the
impossible or the impracticable."
The Yakus and Rottenberg cases involved convictions for violation
of the price ceiling regulations prescribed under the authority of the
Emergency Price Control Act of 1942. Upon similar constitutional .
considerations the convictions were affirmed and the act was upheld.
Chief Justice Stone rendered the opinion saying:
"That Congress has constitutional authority to prescribe commodity prices as a war emergency measure, and that the Act was
adopted by Congress in the exercise of that power, are not questioned here, and need not now be considered save as they have a
bearing on the procedural features of the Act later to be considered
which are challenged on constitutional grounds....
"The Act is thus an exercise by Congress of its legislative
power. In it,Congress has stated the l~gislative objective, has prescribed the method of achieving that objective-maximum price
fixing-and has laid down standards to guide the administrative
determination of both the occasions, for the exercise of the price, fixing power, and the particular prices to be established." [ Citing
cases.]
The Chief Justice then proceeds to distinguish the Schecter case:
"The Act is unlike the National Industrial Recovery Act of
June 16, 1933, 48 Stat. 195, considered in Schechter Poultry Corp.
v. United-States, 295 U.S. 495, 55 S. Ct. 837, 79 L. Ed. 1570,
97 A.L.R. 947, which proclaimed in the broadest terms its purpose
'to rehabilitate industry and to conserve natural resources.' It
prescribed no method of attaining that end save by the establishment of codes of fair competition, the nature of whose permissible
provisions was left undefined. It provided no standards to which
those codes were to conform. The function of formulating the
codes was delegated, not to a public official responsible to Congress
or the Executive, but to private individuals engaged in the industries to be regulated. Compare Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v.
Adkins, supra, 310 U.S. at page 399, 60 S. Ct. at page 915, 84 L.
Ed.- 1263." 214
The· force of these cases in the consideration of this problem is
enormous. It does not seem that there are any real and fundamental distinctions between the discretionary authority conferred upon the ad214

Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 at 422, 423 and 424 (1944).
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ministrators of renegotiation and upon the administrators under the
Emergency Price Control Act. The policy of one is to prevent the
realization of excessive and inordinate profits from war contracts. The
aim ·of the other is the "effective protection of our price structures
against the forces of disorganization and the pressures created by wir
and its attendant activities." 215 There are factual differences in the
standards established by each act for the guidance of the administrators
which may offer superficial distinctions, but to find fundamental differences which would differentiate this holding in the emergency price
control cases from the problems created by the Renegotiation Act, will
be very difficult.216

Impairment of Obligations of Contract
The retroactive features of the Renegotiation Act have created
constitutional problems with regard to contract impairment, most of
which have been dealt with before.211 But there remains for consideration here at least one question of this category which is of prominent
importance. That question is raised by section I of the Military Appropriation Act, 1944,218 which amended the Renegotiation Act to bring
within its scope the four subsidiaries of the Reconstruction Finance
Corporation-The Defense Plant Corporation, Metals Reserve Company, Defense Supplies Corporation and Rubber Reserve Company. At
the time that this amendment became effective, July 1, 1943, many
contracts with these agencies were in effect and many that remained
executory on April 28, 1942, when renegotiation became law, had
become executed before July 1, 1943. Section 1 of the Military Appropriation Act, l 944, makes no mention of whether it was intended
to operate retroactively with respect to contracts held by producers with
these RFC subsidiaries, or only in the future. On this point Congress
was silent. It, therefore, is necessary to seek the legislative intent from
the manner in which the amendment was enacted and other circumstances which attended this legislation.
This amendment was accomplished by directing that there be inserted in the Renegotiation Act sections which brought these RFC subsidiaries within its scope. Section 1 of the Military Appropriation Act,
m Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503 at 513 (1944).
See United States v. Rock Royal Cooperative, Inc., 307 U.S. 533 at 576 and
577, 59 S. Ct. 993 (1939); Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381 at
398, 60 S. Ct. 907 (1940).
217 Steadman, "Legal Aspects of Renegotiation," 42 M1cH. L. REv. 542 at 552
(1944).
218
Pub. L. 108, 78th Cong., 1st sess., approved July 1, 1943.
216

244
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1944 stipulates that subsection (k) should be included in the Renegotiation Act as it was then constituted 219 and amended clauses 1 and 2 of
subsection (a) of the act to read _as follows:
"Provided further, That clauses (1) and (2) of subsection
(a) of section 403 of the Sixth Supplemental National Defense
Appropriation Act, 1942, as'amended, are amended to read as follows:
,
"'Sec. 403 (a) For the purpose of this section" 'I. The term "department" means the War Department,
the Navy Department, the Treasury Department, the Maritime
Commission, Defense Plant ·Corporation, Metals Reserve Company, Defense Supplies Corporation, and Rubber Reserve Company, respectively.'"
No other changes were made in the act. As it then stood section 403, as
amended, obtained with respect to all contracts upon which final payment had not been made as of April 28, 1942. After this amendment
the Renegotiation Act, read as a whole, may appear to gather within its
field all contracts and subcontracts with these RFC subsidiaries which
were unpaid for-executory-on April 28, 1942. If this is what Congress intended, if it intended that the act be retroactive, was an adequate
way selected for expressing this intent? It may be contended that the
means chose~ for adding contracts with the RFC subsidiaries to the area
of renegotiation does not require any additional expression of intent on
the part of Congress in order for it to apply to those contracts on the
same basis that it applies to contracts with the other war agencies. Indeed, a forceful argument can be made that, if it was the intention of
Congress for renegotiation to be operative on a different basis regarding
contracts with the RFC subsidiaries than with respect to contracts held
with the other renegotiating departments, then such an expression must
affirmatively appear. For renegotiation was designed to eliminate unreasonable profits arising from contracts with the war agencies. If the
act is to be applied to contracts with the RFC subsidiaries on a different
ground, then a discrimination in the treatment of these contracts arises
which would seem to require specific direction, since such an unequal
treatment is not entirely logical and thus not to be inferred. On the
other hand, reasons must be recognized for construing the silence of the
statute as an expression that it was to have only prospective applica219

Section 403 of the Sixth Supplemental National Defense Appropriation Act,
1942, Pub. L. 528, 77th Cong., 2d sess., approved April 28, 1942, 56 Stat. L. 226 at
245 as amended by§ 801 of the Revenue Act of 1942, Pub. L. 753, 77th Cong., 2d
sess., approved October 21, 1942, 56 Stat. L. 798 at 982.
/

1944]

RENEGOTIATION

245

tion. It is a well-considered canon of statutory construction that statutes
will be applied only with respect to the future when to give them
retroactive effect will upset rights which are ordinarily considered to
be established. Between July 1, 1943 and April 28, 1942 many contracts with the RFC subsidiaries had become executed. They were fully
and wholly performed. Nothing remained to be done with regard to
them. These are facts difficult to ignore in the study of this problem
and, in the absence of a specific statutory declaration undertaking to
make the act retroactive, the courts may be reluctant to give other than
a prospective application to this amendment.
Renegotiation as it originally became law was effective only with
regard to executory contracts, contracts for which final payment had not
been made on April 28, 1943.220 Perhaps this offers the best argument
against construing this RFC amendment to be retroactive. It is possible
to infer from the attitude of Congress as expressed in the original act
that renegotiation should apply only to executory contracts at any time.
Congressional silence as indicating an intention to apply the act only
in futuro gathers force from the manner in which the other amendments have been made. In the three other amendments to the Renegotiation Act 221 great care was taken to spell out the effective dates of
Subsection (c) (3) of § 403 of the Sixth Supplemental National Defense Appropriation Act, 1942, Pub. L. 528, 77th Cong., 2d sess., approved April 28, 1942, 56
Stat. L. 226 at 245.
221 Section 801 of" the Revenue Act of 1942, Pub. L. 753, 77th Cong., 2d sess.,
approved October 21, 1942, 56 Stat. L. 798 at 982 preceded the enactment of § I
of the Military Appropriation Act, 1944, Pub. L. 108, 78th Cong., 1st sess., approved
July 1, 1943, and two amendments which follow it, Pub. L. 149, 78th Cong., 1st
sess., approved July 14, 1943 and § 701 (b) of the Revenue Act of 1943, Pub. L.
235, 78th Cong., 2d sess., enacted February 25, 1944.
Subsection (d) of § 801 of the Revenue Act of 1942, Pub. L. 753, 77th Cong.,
2d sess., approved October 21, 1942, 56 Stat. L. 798 at 985, states:
"The amendments made by this section shall be effective as of April 28, I 942."
Section 5 of Pub. L. 149, 78th Cong., 1st sess., approved July 14, 1943, states:
"Sec. 5. The amendments made by this Act shall be effective as of April 28,
1942."
.
Section 701(d) of the Revenue Act of 1943, Pub. L. 235, 78th Cong., 2d
sess., enacted February 25, 1944 provides:
"The amendments made by subsection (b) shall be effective only with respect to
the fiscal years ending after June 30, 1943, except that (1) the amendments inserting
subsections (a) (4) (C), (a) (4) (D), (i) (1) (C), (i) (I) (D), (i) (1) (F), (i) (3),
and (1) in section 403 of the Sixth Supplemental National Defense Appropriation
Act, 1942, shall be effective as if such amendments and subsections had been a part of
section 403 of such Act on the date of its enactment, and (2) the amendments adding
subsoction (d) and (e) (2) to section 403 of such Act shall be effective from the date
of the enactment of this Act."
220

4
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the various portions of these- laws and to distinguish particularly between those provisions to be applied retroactively and those which are to
apply on the effective date of these statutes. In view of these facts does
it not seem that Congress would have been equally as careful in its
' expression if it had intended the amendment bringing the RFC sub~ sidiari~s within the Act to be effective as of April 28, 1942? Perhaps
the answer is that Congress expressed itself by directing that the amendment be made by inserting in the s.tatute the changes that have already
-been indicated. Moreover, the fa,ct that Congress stated that other
amendments should be effective as of April 28, 1942 or upon other
specified dates seems to have been necessary because the means adopted
for changing the statute through these amendments was more in the
nature of a rewriting than in the character of revision by inserting a
section in the statute. -The RFC amendment, however, does provide
for the rewriting of subsection (a) of section 403 as amended. It is
quite apparent that-it is difficult to grasp any firm conclusion as to the
legislative intent in this analysis of the statute. The courts have
followed a principle of construction leading them to avoid an unconstitutional interpretation.222 If it can be effectively argued 'that this
amendment construed retroactively would result in an unconstitutional
application of the law then it seems most likely that a prospective application would be established since it must be presumed that Congress
intended to act within the Constitution. There is also to be considered
in this connection the principle that constitutional issues will be avoided
where i~ is not necessary to decide them. 228
222
See Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 at 62, 52 S. Ct. 285 (1932); United
States v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366 at 407-408, 29 S. Ct. 527 (1909).
223
Chicago v. Fieldcrest Dairies, 316 U.S. 168, 62 S. Ct. 986 (1942). The
Court's statement here is worthy of note. ·Mr. Justice Douglas said at p. 173:
"It is of course true that respondent sought to raise in its complaint a constitutional
issue-an issue which lurks in the case even though it not be deemed substantial. But
here, as in the Pullman case, that issue may not survive the litigation in the state courts.
If it does not, the litigation is at an end. That again indicates the wisdom of allowing
the local law issues first to be resolved by -those who have final say. Avoidance of
constitutional adjudications where not absolutely necessary is a .Part of the wisdom of
the doctrine of the Pullman case.''
See also Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 at 498, 61
S. Ct. 643 (1941), wherein Mr. Justice Frankfurter said:
"The complaint of the Pullman porters undoubtedly tendered a substantial constitutionar issue. It is more than substantial. It touches a sensitive area of social policy
upon which the federal courts ought not to enter unless no alternative to its adjudication
is open. Such constitutional adjudication plainly can be avoided if a definitive ruling
on the·state issue would terminate the controversy. It is therefore our duty to turn to a
consideration of questions under Texas law.''
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If the amendment, properly interpreted, means that it is to be applied retroactively so as to be effective with regard to contracts unpaid
for on April 28, 1942, is the amendment unconstitutional as an impairment of contractual obligations? The original law was effective 224
only with regard to executory contracts. When discussing the aspect of
the statute which relates to its application to contracts in existence on
April 28, 1942, but which remained executory at that time, this writer
expressed the opinion that this question was at least yet undecided and
in all probability Justice Stone's concurring opinion in Perry v. United
States 225 would prevail in a decision of this issue. 226 The question
which confronts us here is whether the Constitution under these circumstances confers a different treatment upon executed contracts.
Does the Constitution in prohibiting the states from impairing the
obligation of contracts distinguish between executory and executed
contracts? It would seem that it does not. Authorities beginning with
Fletcher v. Peck 221 and Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 228 and continuing with Wood v. Lovett, 229 have established the
principle that an executed contract is a grant; that the Constitution
makes no differentiation between contracts executed or executory and
that a contract once performed carries with it an agreement not to reassert the right which has been conferred through the performance of
the contract by one party upon the other. Fletcher v. Peck, one of the
land-mark cases in our body of law, stands for these principles.
In that case the Georgia Legislature had undertaken to annul one
of its prior acts which had provided for the transfer of certain land belonging to the state and sought to render "null and void" any claims
that might arise, under that prior act. The grantees of the land, engaging in one of the early land speculations in this country, had sold several
parcels. One of these was purchased by Peck. Peck had then sold to
Fletcher. Fletcher then brought an action (probably collusive 280 )
against Peck for the recovery of the purchase money. The object of this
action was to test one of the covenants in the deed which Fletcher had
received from Peck. The covenant stated that "the title to the premises
had been in no way, constitutionally or legally impaired by virtue
224

April 28, 1942.
294 U.S. 330 at 359-361, 55 S. Ct. 432 (1935).
226
Steadman, "Legal Aspects of Renegotiation," 42 M1cH. L. REv. 545 at 557
(1944).
22
' 6 Cranch (10 U.S.) 87 {1810).
228
4 Wheat. (17 U.S.) 518 (1819).
229
313 U.S. 362, 61 S. Ct. 983 (1941).
230
3 BEVERIDGE, THE LIFE OF JoHN MARSHALL 583-584 (1919).
225
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of any subsequent act of any subsequent legislature of the state of
Georgia." 231 Fletcher alleged a breach of this covenant and the Court
was presented with the issue of whether the subsequent action of the
Georgia legislature repealing the grant of lands impaired Fletcher's
title. It was held that there was no impairment of title and that the attempt of the Georgia Legislature to repeal the grant was without any
force or effect. Marshall rendered the opinion. He said:
" ... The constitution of the United States declares that no
state shall pass any bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts.
"Does the case now under consideration come within this prohibitory section of the constitution? In considering this very interesting question, we immediately ask ourselves, what is a contract?
Is a grant a contract? A contract is a compact between two or more
parties, and is either executory or executed. An executory contract
is one in which a party binds himself to do, or not to do, a particular thing; such was the law under which the conveyance was made
by the governor. A contract executed is one in which the object
of contract is performed; and this, says Blackstone, differs in nothing from a grant. The contract between Georgia and the purchasers was executed by the grant. A contract executed, as well as
one which is executory, contains obligations binding on the parties.
A grant, in its own nature, amounts to an extinguishment of the
right of the grantor, and implies a contract not to reassert that
right. A party is, therefore, always estopped by his own grant.
"Since, then, in fact, a grant is a contract executed, the obligation of which still continues; and since the constitution uses the
general term contract, without distinguishing between those which
are executory and those which are executed, it must be construed
to comprehend the latter as well as the former. A law annulling
conveyances between individuals, and declaring that the grantors
- should stand seized of their former estates, notwithstanding those
grants, would be as r~pugnant to the constitution, as a law discharging the vendors of property from the obligation of executing
their contracts by conveyances. It would be strange if a contract
to convey was secured by the constitution, while an absolute conveyance remained unprotected.
"If, under a fair construction of the ~onstitution, grants are
comprehended under the term contracts, is a grant from the state
excluded from the operation of the provision? ls the clause to be
considered as inhibiting the state from impairing the obligation of
231

6 Cranch (10 U.S.) 87 at 131 (1810).
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contracts between two individuals, but as excludiRg from that inhibition contracts made with itself? The words themselves contain
no such distinction. They are general, and are applicable to contracts of every description. If contracts made with the state are to
be exempted from their operation, the exception must arise from
the character of the contracting party, not from the words which
are employed." 282
Marshall thought that a contract still remained a contract even
though the promised performance had been given and received. The
Court in Fletcher v. Peck was, of course, construing that part of Article
I, section IO of the Constitution, which prohibits the states from passing
laws which impair the obligations of contracts. The prohibition against
the Federal Government's impairing contractual obligations arises
through the Fifth Amendment which bars the Federal Government
from depriving persons of property without due process of law by
virtue of a construction of the term "property," for, as it there appears,
it includes contracts.288 And "contract" in the Fifth Amendment must
be presumed to have the same meaning which attaches to that word as
used throughout the Constitution. If such is the case then contracts,
whether executory or executed, are embraced within the Fifth Amendment and the powers of Congress are either sufficiently broad or not
broad enough to permit impairment of contractual obligations under the
circumstances which gave rise to renegotiation. The more fundamental
inquiry here is whether the Constitution permits the impairment of
these contractual obligations.284
If the Court decides that the RFC amendment is retroactive to
April 28, 1942 and therefore includes executed contracts, it is unlikely
that it will undertake to question the legislative wisdom in this regard. 285 The problem remaining open to the Court would seem to be
one purely of determining whether the prohibition of the Fifth Amendment is sufficiently hostile to the impairment of these contractual obligations to compel a decision which would omit them from renegotiation.
282

Id. at 136-13 7.
•
Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 751, 54 S. Ct. 840 (1934). See also,
Wilner v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 54 S. Ct. 840 (1934); United States v.
Weaver, (C.C.A. 4th, 1936) 86 F. (2d) 372; Moragne v. United States, (D.C.S.C.
1936) 16 F. Supp. 1008.
284
Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330 at 359 (1935), concurring opinion of
Mr. Justice Stone; Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571 (1934).
285
Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 at 337-338, 24 S.
Ct. 436 (1903); Railroad Commission of Texas v. Rowan & Nichols Oil Co., 310 U.S.
573, 60 S. Ct. 1021 (1940).
288
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The same considerations attend this problem which n;mst be considered
in deciding whether Congress has the power under war circumstances to
impair those contracts in existence on April 28, r942. The disastrous
effect of excessive profits from war contracts upon inflation and national esprit, the lack of competition brought about through wartime
conditions and the
general
maintenance of a wartime economy must all
•
I
be considered here in deciding whether this is such a situation as to
permit the exercise of congressional powers in a way that might otherwise be regarded as an unconstitutional interference with individual
rights. Whether the exigencies of war permit congressional power to
encompass the regulation of wartime business in such a way as to interfe~e and impair contract rights leads to an exploration of the true nature
of the Renegotiation Act. What kind of a regulation is it and how does
it fit within the scope of substantive due process?
Renegotiation as a Regulation of War Business-Substantive
Due Process
"The Fifth Amendment, in the field of federal activity, and
the Fourteenth, as respects state action, do _not prohibit governmental regulation for the public welfare. They merely condition
the exertion of the admitted power, by securirig that the end shall
be accomplished by methods consistent with due process. And
the guaranty of due process, as has often been held, demands only
that the law shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, and
that the means selected shall have a real and substantial relation
to the object sought to be attained. It results that a regulation
valid for one sort of business, or in given circumstances, may be
invalid for another sort, or for the same business under other circumstances, because the reasonableness of each regulation depends
upon the relevant facts." 2361
,
. Renegotiation is a means of wartime business regulation. It is a
· measure seeking to regulate the prices for war commodities by imposing
a limitation upon profits. Among its objectives _are the suppression of
inflation and the reduction of the cost of the war. These beyond question are legitimate governmental aims.
In those cases where prices at which war goods are to be delivered
were agreed upon prior to the passage of the Renegotiation Act or prior
to the amendment which included the RFC subsidiaries, the question
is posed as to whether the congressional power is sufficiently great to
permit such price regulation or whether i:q. attempting to do so the
236

Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 at 525, 54 S. Ct. 505 (1934).
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constitutional features of substantive due process have been transgressed.
The use of property in the making of contracts and the establishment of prices at which goods are to be sold are normally regarded in
the conduct of business matters as of private rather than governmental
concern. But this is not always so and government interference in these
fields has received approval under many circumstances. There has been
a growing tendency, especially in the past decade, for Congress as well
as the state legislatures to find it necessary to impose regulations on the
use of private property, the making of contracts and the establishment
of prices. These regulations have been generally upheld as a proper
exercise of the police powers, and the subordination of private rights to
the public benefit has often been held to be within the power of the
legislatures under both the Fifth 287 and the FourteenthAmendments.288
Without undertaking an exhaustive review of the cases which have
brought the courts to what is believed to be their present point of view,
a recital of a few of the things that can be constitutionally regulated or
prohibited will illustrate this point. Laws regulating or prohibiting billboard advertising,239 kinds of construction,240 and zoning 241 are all
permissible. Regulations aimed at preventing waste of natural resources,242 forbidding unfair competition 248 and prohibiting monopolies 244 are recognized as being within the regulatory power of the state.
237
Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 at 228, 20 S. Ct.
96 (1899).
238
Welch v. Swasey, 214 U.S. 91, 29 S. Ct. 567 (1909); Hebe Co. v. Shaw,
248 U.S. 297, 39 S. Ct. 125 (1919); Pierce Oil Corp. v. City of Hope, 248 U.S.
498, 39 S. Ct. 172 (1919); Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries Co., 251 U.S. 146 at
157, 40 S. Ct. 106 (1919); Euclid, Ohio, Village of, v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S.
365, 47 S. Ct. l 14 (1927); West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 57 S. Ct.
578 (1937); Barbier v. Connolly, II3 U.S. 27 at 31, 5 S. Ct. 357 (1885); Chicago
B. & J. R. Co. v. Illinois, ex rel. Drainage Commissioners, 200 U.S. 561 at 592, 26
S. Ct. 341 (1906). The Fifth Amendment imposes no greater restraint upon the
national government than the Fourteenth Amendment does upon the states. United
States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 at 125, 61 S. Ct. 451 (1941).
289
Cusak v. City of Chicago, 242 U.S. 526, 37 S. Ct. 190 (1917); St. Louis
Poster Advertising Co. v. St. Louis, 249 U.S. 269, 39 S. Ct. 274 (1919).
24
Fischer v. St. Louis, 194 U.S. 361, 24 S. Ct. 673 (1904); Hadacheck v.
&:bastian, 239 U.S. 394, 36 S. Ct. 143 (1915).
241
Euclid, Ohio, Village of, v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1927); Gorieb
v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603, 47 S. Ct. 675 (1927).
u 2 Champlin Refining Co. v. Corporation Commission of Oklahoma, 286 U.S.
210, 52 S. Ct. 559 (1932).
•
24
~ Van Camp & Sons v. American Can Co., 278 U.S. 245, 49 S. Ct. II2 (1929).
244
Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States , 175 U.S. 211 at 228-229 ( 1899) ;
Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 at 332 (1903); United Shoe
Machinery Corp. v. United States, 258 U.S. 251 at 462-464, 42 S. Ct. 363 (1922).
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The ba~is upon which persons doing business may enter into contracts
and the terms upon which they may agree are within the power of the
state.245 The amount of fire insurance premiums that may be paid can
be fixed 246 and laws pr.eventing usury are not unconstitutional.247 Compensation to be paid to an insurance company's agents may be regulated. 248 Moreover, the coal industry is subject to regulation 249 and the
handling of milk is subject to governmental regulation. 250 Nor is this
the least of the regulatory control that rests with the legislature. The
fixing of prices has been upheld where necessary to the public interest.251
Labor relations,252 hours of work, 253 employment of children,254 working conditions for women 255 have all been subjected to governmental
fiat.
The power to impose these regulations depends upon the circumstances of each case. What is due process in one instance may not be in
another. But there is nothing in the Constitution assuring that business
may be conducted free from regulation and there is no category of
business which may not, under the proper circumstances, be governed
by laws reasonably related to a prop~r legislative aim even though
245
Chicago B. & Q. R.R. Co. v. McGuire, 219 U.S. 549, 31 S. Ct. 259 (1911);
Orient Ins. Co. v. Daggs, 172 U.S. 557, 19 S., Ct. 281 {1899); Whitfield v. Aetna
· Life Ins. Co., 205 U.S. 489, 27 S. Ct. 578 (1907); Selover, Bates & Co. v. Walsh,
226 U.S. 112, 33 S. Ct. 69 (1912); Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Nelson
Mfg. Co., 291 U.S. 352, 54 S. Ct. 392 (1934).
246
German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 233 U.S. 389, 34 S. Ct. 612 (1914).
247
Griffith v. Connecticut, 218 U.S. 563, 31 S. Ct. 132 (1910).
248
O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford Ins. Co., 282 U.S. 251, 51 S. Ct. 130
(1931).
249
Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381 at 398, 6b S. Ct. 907
(1940).
250
United States v. Rock Royal Cooperative Inc., 307 U.S. 533, 59 S. Ct. 993
(1939); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
251
Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 41 S. Ct. 458 (1921); Public Service Commission v. Great Northern Utilities Co., 289 U.S. 130, 53 S. Ct. 546 (1933); Bowles
v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503, 64 S. Ct. 641 (1944); Yakus v. United States, 321
U.S. 414, 64 S. Ct. 660 (1944); Rottenberg v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 64 S.
Ct. 660 (1944).
252
National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Co., 301 U.S. 1,
57 S. Ct. 615 (1937); N.L.R.B. v. Freuhauf Trailer Co., 301 U.S. 49, 57 S. Ct. 642
(1937); Washington, Virginia & Maryland Coach Co. v. N.L.R.B., 301 U.S. 142, 57
• S. Ct. 648 (1937); Associated Press v. N.L.R.B., 301 U.S. 103, 57 S. Ct. 650
(1937); Consolidated Edison Co. of New York v. N.L.R.B., 305 U.S. 197, 59 S. Ct.
206 (1938).
253
Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U.S. 426, 37 S. Ct. 435 (1917).
254
Sturges& Burn Mfg. Co. v. Beauchamp, 231 U.S. 320, 34 S. Ct. 60 (1913).
255
.Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 28 S. Ct. 324 (1908); Radice v. New
York, 264 U.S. 292, 44 S. Ct. 325 (1924).
0
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there is a restriction on the freedom of the contractor or an impairment
of contractual obligations.
In N ebbia v. New York 256 the Supreme Court upheld an act of the
New York Legislature which conferred upon the Milk Control Board
of that state the power to fix the price to be charged or paid for milk and
imposed penalties for violation of any such order. The statute and the
order were attacked as being a denial of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, and therefore unconstitutional. The Court decided
that prices could be fixed directly under the circumstances existing in the
milk industry during the depression period of 1932, which had become
chaotic because of prices which were below cost. Mr. Justice Roberts,
rendering the opinion of the Court, said:
". . . The Constitution does not secure to anyone liberty to
conduct his business in such fashion as to inflict injury upon the
public at large, or upon any substantial group of people. Price control, like any other form of regulation, is unconstitutional only if
arbitrary, discriminatory, or demonstrably irrelevant to the policy
the legislature is free to adopt, and hence an unnecessary and unwarranted interference with individual liberty." 257
The N ebbia case is not the first one to uphold direct price control but it
certainly clearly established that direct price control by legislative action may be undertaken in any industry where the situation so warrants.
Beginning with Munn v. Illinois, 258 which upheld a statute regulating the price that might be charged for the storage of grain, a succession
of cases have firmly established the legislative right to determine prices
where circumstances require. But Chief Justice Waite in Mwn-n v. Illinois rested his conclusions upon the convenient phrase that the business
involved was "affected with a public interest." 259 From then until the
Nebbia decision the courts have been imbued with the "public interest"
idea as a requisite for price regulation. 260 As an argument for upholding
the constitutionality of renegotiation it might well be contended that all
256

291 U.S. 502 (1934).
Id., 291 U.S. at 538-539.
258
94 U.S. 113 {1876).
259
94 U.S. 113 at 126 (1876).
260
Wolff Packing Co. v. Industrial Court, 262 U.S. 522, 43 S. Ct. 630 (1923);
Tyson & Bros. v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418, 47 S. Ct. 426 (1927); Ribnik v. McBride,
277 U.S. 350, 48 S. Ct. 545 (1928); Williams v. Standard Oil Co., 278 U.S. 235,
49 S. Ct. 115 (1929); New State lee Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 52 S. Ct. 371
(1932). "The notion of a distinct category of business 'affected with a puqlic interest,'
employing property 'devoted to a public use,' rests upon historical error." Brandeis, J.
dissenting in id., 285 U.S. at 302.
257
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business in wartime is "affected with a public interest"; that modern
war reaches all types and natures of business. Since the N ebbia case,
however, no reliance need be placed upon such an argument.261 For that
case _explains the phrase "affected with the public interest" as merely a
way of stating the conclusion that due process has been satisfied. Mr.
Justice Roberts said:
"It is clear that there is no closed class or category of businesses
affected with a public interest, and the function of courts in' the application of the Fifth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendments is
261

An interesting discussion upon the trend of business regulation is found in
Dodd's article "For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?" 45 HARV. L. REV.
1145 (1932). There the author tracing the history of regulation says at page u48·.
"Several hunqred years ago, when business enterprises were small affairs involving
the activities, of men rather than the employment of capital, our law took the position
that business is a public profession rather than a purely private matter, and that the
businessman, far from being free to obtain all the profits which his skill in bargaining
might secure for him, owes a legal duty to give adequate service at reasonable rates.
Although a growing belief in liberty of contract and in the efficacy of free competition
to prevent extortion led to· abandonment of this theory for business as a whole, the
theory survived as the rule applicable to the carrier and the innkeeper. In recent years
we have seen this carrier law expanded to include a variety of businesses classed as
public utilities. Under modern conditions the conduct of such businesses normally
involves the use of a substantial amount of property. This fact, together with the
accidental circumstances that a passage from Lord Hale was quoted in one of the
briefs in the leading case of Munn v. Illinois, had led to a change in the conventional
legal phraseology. Instead of talking, as the early judges talked, in terms of the duty
of one engaged in business activities toward the. public who are his customers, it has
become the practice since Munn v. Illinois, to talk of the public duty of one who has
devoted his property to public use, the conception being that property_ employed in
certain kinds of business is devoted to public use while property employed in other
kinds of business remains strictly private.
•
"This approach to the problem has been justly criticized as attempting to draw
an unreasonably clean-cut distinction between businesses which do not differ substantially,
and furnishing no intelligible criterion by which to distinguish those businesses which
are private property from those which are property devoted. to public use. The phrase
does, however, have the merit of. emphasizing the fact that business is permitted and
encouraged by the law primarily because it is of service to the community rather than
because it is a source of profit to its owners. Accordingly, where it appears that unlimited
private profit is incompatible with adequate service, the claim of those engaged therein
that the business belongs to them in an unqualified sense and can be pursued in such
manner as they choose need not be accepted by the legislature. Despite certain recent
conservative decisions such as Tyson v. Banton, it may well be that the law is approaching
a point of view which will regard all business as affected with a public interest. If
certain businesses then continue to' be allowed unregulated profits, it will be as a matter
of legislative policy because the lawmakers regard the competitive· conditions under
which such businesses are carried on as making regulation of profits unnecessary, and
not because the owners of such enterprises have any constitutional right to have their
property treated as private in the sense in which property held merely for personal use
'is private."
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to determine in each case whether circumstances vindicate the
challenged regulations as a reasonable exercise of governmental
authority or condemn it as arbitrary or discriminatory. Wolff
Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations, 262 U.S. 522, 535,
43 S. Ct. 630, 67 L. Ed. I 103, 27 A.L.R. 1208. The phrase
'affeeted with a public interest' can, in the nature of things, mean
no more than that an industry, for adequate reasons, is subject to
control for the public good. In several of the decisi9ns of this
court wherein the expressions 'affected with a public interest' and
'clothed with a public use' have been brought forward as the criteria of the validity of price control, it has been admitted that they
are not susceptible of definition and form an unsatisfactory test of
the constitutionality of legislation directed at business prac,:tices or
prices. These decisions must rest, finally, upon the basis that the
requirements of due process were not met because the laws were
found arbitrary in their operation and effect. But there can be no
doubt that upon proper occasion and by appropriate measures the
state may regulate a business in any of its aspects, including the
prices to be charged for the products or commodities it sells." 262
No better precedents need be sought nor can be found for governing
this discussion than Bowles v. Willingham 268. and Yakus v. Umted
States, which upheld th~ constitutionality of the Emergency Price Control Act.264 There it was determined that the congressional power under
the circumstances of war and the requirements for maintaining a reasonable price structure as well as the prevention of inflation was such as to
permit the regulation and the fixing of prices for rents and commodities
which were sold to the general public. Mr. Justice Douglas rendering
the opinion in the Bowles case said:
" ... We need not determine what constitutional limits there
are to price-fixing legislation. Congress was dealing here with conditions created by activities resulting from a great war effort.
Yakus v. United States, supra. A nation which can demand the
lives of its men and women in the waging of that war is under no
constitutional necessity of providing a system of price control on
the domestic front which will assure each landlord a 'fair return'
on his property." 265
" ... as we have held in Yakus v. United States, supra, Con262

Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 at 536 (1934).
321 U.S. 503 (1944).
m 321 U.S. 414 (1944).
265
321 U.S. 503 at 519 (1944).
263
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gress was dealing here with the exigencies of wartime conditions
and the insistent demands of inflation control."2 66
All that can be said for these cases is equally applicable to renegotiation.
The regulation of war prices and profits is equally as necessary and
proper as that of rents and meat.
There has been some attention given to the theory that renegotiation is something·in the nature of a public utilities regulation. It seems
possible to support renegotiation, as far as the satisfaction of substantive
due process of the Fifth Amendment is concerned, upon the ground
that because the essential features of competition are largely lacking in
the awarding of war contracts, and since such sales are being made directly or indirectly to op.e customer, the Government, that a monopoly
has arisen in the industry. The war industries may then be regarded
as being something like public utilities and renegotiation like utility
rate making. At first blush this contention may appear to have merit.
But the thought that there must be a monopoly before price control can
constitutionally be undertaken has been exploded.267 Indeed, the grain
elevators regulated by a statute which the Court in Munn v. Illinois
said was constitutional, were not monopolies. It was the recognition of
lack of competition which contributed to the enactment of the Renegotiation Law and caused Congress to continue reneg~tiation even in
the face of more than a little opposition. At an earlier period in our
jurisprudence, this argument would have formed a very useful basis
for upholding renegotiation. It would have served as a basis for bringing war industry within the normally accepted concepts of the courts._
It would have clothed industry in such a way that the courts might
recognize it as the kind of thing over which the legislature might exercise its regulatory powers. Such a contention would have so characterized renegotiation as to make it appear as a regulation more likely to
find acceptance because of the nature of the thing being regulated.
There was a time when the regulation of prices outside the utilities
field was not a matter well regarded by the courts. However, as we
266

Id. at 520.
See Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 at 534-535 (1934):
"The touchstone of public interest in any business, its practices, and charges, clearly
is not the enjoyment of any franchise from the state, Munn v. Illinois, supra. Nor is it
the enjoyment of a monopoly; for in Brass v. North Dalrota, 153 U.S. 391, 14 S. Ct.
857, 38 L. Ed. 757, a similar control of prices of grain elevators was upheld in spite
of overwhelming and uncontradicted proof that about six hundred grain elevators existed
along the line of the Great Northern Railroad, in North Dakota; that at the very
station where the defendant's elevator was located two others operated; and that the
business was keenly competitive throughout the state."
267
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have already seen, such an argument is not necessary as a ground for
supporting renegotiation as a proper regulation under due process. Th~
analogy between renegotiation and utility rate-making is questionable.
True, utilities operate as monopolies and there is a great deal of fact to
support the view that war industries are in a sense monopolies. It is
also true that utility rate-making is usually made upon an individual
basis, company by company, and excessive profits are determined in
renegotiation company by company. And in both instances the circumstances for each utility or each war producer are separately considered in
determining the fairness of the rate or the fairness of the price and
profit. But here, the similarity between rate-making and the determination of excessive profits seems to end.
The sounder analysis of the character of renegotiation is that which
has already been advanced. It is a price and profit regulation of war
business. The analogy to utility rate-making in the case of renegotiation
is not necessary nor is it accurate. The two fields do not square with each
other. Utility rate-making and business price regulation rest upon concepts that have deep seated and fundamental differences. Business price
regulation has developed primarily through an exercise of the police
power of the state. 268 Utility regulation, however, was conceived as an
exercise of the power of eminent domain.269 As such it has conformed to
the requirements of just compensation for a "taking" of property, out
of which have developed theories of "fair value" and principles for preventing "deprivation" and "confiscation." 210 There is nothing in the
Constitution that requires the owner of property to be compensated for
any loss of value or any loss of property which results from proper regulation.211 And there is no sound reason why utility regulation should
be governed by other principles than those which obtain in the exercise.
of the police powers. Yet, for what appear to be only historical reasons,
268
Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934); Olsen v. State of Nebraska, ex
rel. Western Reference & Bond Assoc., Inc., 313 U.S. 236, 61 S. Ct. 862 (1941).
269
See: Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 18 S. Ct. 418 (1898); West v. Chesapeake
& Potomac Telephone Co., 295 U.S. 662 at 671, 55 S. Ct. 894 (1935); Denver Union
Stockyard Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 470, 58 S. Ct. 990 (1938); Driscoll v.
Edison Light & Power Co., 307 U.S. 104, 59 S. Ct. 715 (1939); Federal Power
Commission v. Natural Pipe Line Gas Company, 315 U.S. 575, 62 S. Ct. 736 (1942);
concurring opinion of Justices Black, Douglas and Murphy in id., 3 l 5 U.S. at 602;
Henderson, "Railway Valuation and the Courts," 33 HARV. L. REv. 1031 (1920).
270
Hale, "Does the Ghost of Smyth v. Ames Still Walk?" 55 HARV. L. REv.
l I I 6 at I I 39 ( I 942) .
271
Euclid, Ohio, Village of,'"· Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1927); Omnia
Commercial Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 502, 43 S. Ct. 437 (1923); Bowles v.
Willingham, 321 U.S. 503 at 516-518 (1944).
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utility regulation has been controlled by the doctrines of "fair return
on the fair value" and "just compensation," which were given a Promethean spirit in our law by Ames v. Union Pacific Railway 212 and Smyth
v Ames 213 The Nebbia Case freed-the courts from the principal dis.:.
closed in Munn v. Illinois: that to be subject to regulation a business
must be "affected with a public interest." But the Court in its attempts
to separate utility rate regulation from the theories of eminent domain
and to "lay the ghost of Smyth v. Ames'' 214 has found the ghost of no
easy virtue.275 The confusion between confiscation and just compensation on the one hand and the regulation of business under police power
on the other has not been dispelled. 216 To apply an analogy between
renegotiation and utility rate regulation would only serve to envelope
in a cloud of uncertainty the truth as to the nature of renegotiation.
The Renegotiation Act as a regulation of prices and profits could hardly
stem from the pr'inciples of eminent domain, for then every recapture
of-profits ~ould involve a "taking'' for which just compensation must
be given so as to place the contractor in as good a.position as if he had
not been renegotiated; a result, no doubt, which would be agreeable to
most, but which would obviously render renegotiation a nullity. Renegotiation is no more an exercise of the power of eminent domain and
involves a "taking" to no greater extent than did the Emergency Price
Control Act in the case of Bowles v. Willingham. There the Court
said: 211
" ... Weare not dealing here with a situation which involves a
'taking' of property. Wilson v. Brown, supra. By § 4( d) of the
Act it is provided that _'nothing in this Act shall be construed to
212

(C.C.D. Neb. 1894) 64- Fed. 165 at 177.
169 U.S. 466 (1898).
274
Concurring opinion of Justices Black, Douglas and Murphy in Federal Power
Commission v. Natural Pipe Line Gas Co., 315 U.S. 575 at 599 (1942).
275
See the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Driscoll v. Edison
Light & Power Co., 307 U.S. 104 at 122 (1939).
276
Federal Power Commission v. Natural Pipe Line Gas Co., 315 U.S. 575 at
603-604 (1942). Little more than a year after the Court, through an opinion of Mr.
Justice Roberts, had decided that there was nothing "sacrosant" about the fixing of
prices and had put aside the principle that business must be affected with a public
interest for it to be subject to regulation, West v. Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone
Co., 295 U.S. 662 (1935) was decided. Mr. Justice Roberts also rendered that
opinion, saying: ''When the property itself is taken by the exertion of the power of
eminent domain, just compensatioDi is its value at the time of the taking. So, where by
legislation prescribing rates or charges the use of the property js taken, just compensation
assured by these constitutional provisions is a reasonable rate of return upon that value"
(p. 671).
211
321 U.S. 503 at 517 (1944).
'
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require any person to sell any commodity or to offer any accomodations for rent.' There is no requirement that the apartments in
question be used for purposes which bring them under the Act. Of
course, price control, the same as other forms of regulation, may
reduce the value of the property regulated. But, as we have
pointed out in the Hope Natural Gas Co. case (320 U. S. page
601, 64 S. Ct. 2 8 1), that does not mean that the regulation is
unconstitutional. Mr. Justice, Holmes, speaking for the Court,
stated in Block v. Hirsh, supra, 256 U.S. page 155, 41 S. Ct. page
459, 65 L. Ed. 865, 16 A.L.R. 165: 'The fact that tangible property is also visible tends to give a rigidity to our conception of our
rights in it that we do not attach to others less concretely clothed.
But the notion that the former are exempt from the legislative
modification required from time to time in civilized life is contradicted not only by the doctrine of eminent domain, under
which what is taken is paid for, but by that of the police power in
its proper sense, under which property rights may be cut down,
and to that extent taken, without pay.' A member. of the class
which is regulated may suffer economic losses not shared by others.
His property may lose utility and depreciate in value as a consequence of regulation. But that has never been a barrier to the
exercise of the police power. [Citing cases.] And the restraints
imposed on the national government in this regard by the Fifth
Amendment are no greater than those imposed on the States by
the Fourteenth. Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries Co., supra;
United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. rno, 657, 6r S. Ct. 451, 85 L.
Ed. 609, 132 A.L.R. 1430."
Of course, if renegotiation is an unconstitutional enactment, excessive profits recaptured are a "taking'' in the sense that one has been
deprived of profit without proper satisfaction of law. If the interference with contractual rights caused by renegotiation is justifiable
under these wartime conditions in the light of the aim which the act
seeks to serve, it will have conformed to the constitutional principles
of substantive due process.
Let us now explore whether procedural due process has been
satisfied, whether Congress has fairly given the parties a chance to
put forward their views at some point in the proceedings.
1

PROCEDURAL DuE PROCESS

The procedural provisions of the Renegotiation Act generate some
acute problems of procedural due process. Opportunity for hearing and
judicial review of administrative determinations, or lack of it, form this

260

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43

field of inquiry. Delegation of judicial power is a correlative matter
for consideration. Generally speaking, procedural due process requires
that there be an opportunity for a fair hearing which offers to the interested parties the chance "through evidence and argument to challenge the result" and to a determination upon the evidence in a way
that is not arbitrary. 278 Neither the 1942 or 1943 Renegotiation Acts
seem lacking in these respects. The 1942 Act states nothing that specifically requires the secretary of the department conducting the renegotiation to provide a hearing in so many words. It seems, however, that the
opportunity to be heard is inherent in the arrangement -of the act.
Renegotiation by its nature contemplates an undertaking to reach an
agreement for the elimination of excessive profits and, failing in this,
the issuance of an order determining the amount of such profits and
providing for their recapture. The 1942 Act contains provisions to
support this position. It provides that whenever the secretary believes
excessive profits have been realized from renegotiable contracts that he
is "authorized and directed to require the contractor or subcontractor to
renegotiate the contract price." 279 Renegotiation under this statute, it
is true, includes "the refixing by the Secretary of the Department of the
contract price," 280 and the provision of the act in relation to the making
of agreements is permissive in that the "Secretary may make such final
or other agreements with a contractor ... for the determination of excessive profits ... as the Secretary deems desirable." 281 Nevertheless,
that portion of the statute which directs and authorizes the secretary to
require the contractor to renegotiate contract prices lends itself to no
other logical interpretation than that negotiations with the contractor
must be had preliminary to the fixing of any such prices or the making
of a u.r{ilateral order for the recapture of excessive profits. "Renegotiation" as used in this connection is clearly not in the sense of refixing
of the contract price, since any such refixing would not be by the
contractor or subcontractor, but rather through the direction of the
secretary himself.' If this reasonably is the meaning of the statuteand the activities of the departments administering the act show that
they consider negotiations preliminary to the entry of an order to be a
necessary part of the renegotiation procedure-then it appears that the
278

Railroad Commission of California v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 302 U.S. 388
at 393, 58 S._Ct. 334 (1938).
279 Subsection ( c) ( l) of the 1942 Act.
280
Subsection (a) (3) of the 1942 Act.
281
Subsection (c) (4) of the 1942 Act. (Italics supplied.)
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contractor will have a chance to be heard during the process of negotia.
tton.
Nor is this the end of his chance for a voice in the proceedings. If
he is dissatisfied with the determination of the secretary he may file in
the Tax Court for a redetermination of the amount of excessive profits
which the secretary has found. The procedures of the Tax Court are
such that a hearing before that tribunal would fully satisfy the requirements of procedural due process in the determination of excessive
profits.282 It -is not clear that the act compels a hearing before the issuance of a unilateral order determining excessive J?rofits is made by
the secretary. But this would not seem to affect its constitutionality as
long as the opportunity for a hearing is provided, as it is, at some place
in the proceeding.288
What has been said about the adequacy of the 1942 Renegotiation
Act in this connection applies with even greater vigor to the 1943 Act,
for the 1943 Act contains explicit provisions requiring that notice be
given and conferences held aimed at the making of an agreement. The
statute furthermore provides that if an agreement cannot be reached,
then the board shall eliminate excessive profits by order. Inasmuch as
the 1943 Act contemplates that the War Contracts Price Adjustment
Board will make use of the existing organization in the various renegotiating departments used prior to the enactment of this statute and/or
it contemplated that the original renegotiation proceedings would be
conducted within those departments, there is provided before the War
Contracts Price Adjustment Board a review of any determinations made
by the secretaries which the contractor may obtain at his request. Lastly,
a final administrative hearing on appeal from the board's order is
provided to the Tax Court. Thus, we find that notice is required before
the determination of excessive profits and two administrative reviews
are provided the contractor, one by the War Contracts Price Adjustment Board and one by the Tax Court of the United States. We say
"administrative review" with regard to the proceeding conducted by
the Tax Court since, as mentioned before, the Tax Court is an administrative agency-it is not a "Court." 284 The Board of Tax Appeals,

.

282
The Tax Court procedures have received favorable commendation from the
Supreme Court which recently said in speaking of the Tax Court that its "procedures
assure fair hearings" and that it "has established a tradition of freedom from bias and
pressures." Dobson v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 320 U.S. 489 at 498, 64
S. Ct. 239 (1943).
288
Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 305 at 519 (1944). Cf. Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v. State Board of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 36 S. Ct. 141 (1915).
284
Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 279 U.S. 716,
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predecessor to the Tax Court, was defined in the statute which created
it as an "independent agency in the Executive Branch of the Government." 285 The name of this agency was changed but its duties remain
the same.286
We nqw come to the question of the finality which may be given to
administrative det~rminations without permitting resort to the courts,
and to the problem of delegating judicial power. The 1943 Renegotiation Act prohibits a review of the determination of excessive profits
made by the Tax Court. Subsection (e) (1) of the 1943 Act provides:
"· .. Upon•such filing such court shall have exclusive jurisdiction, by order, to finally determine the amount, if any; of any
such excessive profits, received or accrued by the contractor or
subcontractor, and su.ch determination shall not be reviewed or,
redetermined by any court or agency."
Does this provision of the act violate procedural due process by excluding judicial review? And is it an unconstitutional delegation of
judicial power?
It is first important to define the essential features of a determination of excessive profits the review of which is prohibited. The 1943
Act says that:
"The terms 'renegotiate' and 'renegotiation' include a determination by agreement or order under this section of the amount
.of any excessive profits." 281
The determination then is the finding of an amount of profits considered to be excessive under the act.
In order to perform its functions under renegotiation the Tax Court
in considering a petition asking that a finding of excessive profits be
redetermined of necessity has to exercise law-determining powers. The
Tax Court must find the facts.288 It must then apply the law to those
facts and in so doing, like most administrative agencies, decides questions of law. This raises the issue of whether there has been a delegation of judicial power to the Tax Court in violation of Article III,
section 1, of the Constitution.289 The question of delegation of judicial
49 S. Ct.. 499 (1929). Dobson v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 320 U.S. 489
(1943).
285
43 ,Stat. L. 253 at 338 (1924); 44 Stat. L. 9 at 105 (1926); 53 Stat. L.
158 (1939).
286
56 Stat. L. 798 at 957 (1942).
281 Subsection (a) '(3) of the 1943 Act.
288 The proceeding is de novo. Subsection ( e) ( l) of the 194 3 Act.
289 "The. judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme
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power was specifically raised in Sunshine Anthracite . Coal Co. v.
Adkins.290 There the Bituminous Coal Act was attacked upon the
ground, among others, that it provided for an unconstitutional delegation of judicial power to the administrative agencies which Congress
established for the regulation of bituminous coal production. The Court
in discussing this question said through Mr. Justice Douglas:
"Nor is there an invalid delegation of j,udicial power. To
hold that there was would be to turn back the clock on at least a
half century of administrative law. The question of whether or
not appellant should be subjected to the regulatory provisions of
the Bituminous Coal Act was one which the Congress could decide
in the exercise of its powers under the commerce clause. In lieu
of making that decision itself, it could bring to its aid the services
of an administrative agency. And it could delegate to that agency
the determination of the question of fact whether a particular coal
producer fell within the Act. Shields v. Utah Idaho Central R.
Co., supra, p. I 80. The fact that such determination involved ari
interpretation of the term "bituminous coal" is of no more significance here than was the fact that in the Shields case a decision by
the Interstate Commerce Commission of what constituted an "interurban" electric railway was necessary for the ultimate finding
as to the applicability of the Railway Labor Act to carriers. That
problem involves no more than the adequacy of the standard governing the exercise of the delegated authority. Furthermore, on
this phase of the case, appellant has received all the judicial review to which it is entitled. As we have seen, it obtained a review
under § 6 (b) of the Commission's denial of its application for
exemption. The functions of the courts cease when it is ascertained
that the findings of the Commission meet the statutory test.
Rochester Telephone Corp. v. United States, 307 U.S. 125,
146."291

The Renegotiation Act dictates that the courts shall not inquire into
the determined amount of excessive profits; but how far can Congress
go in making this administrative determination of excessive profits a
final one, and to what extent can judicial inquiry be restricted without
Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and
establish. The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices
during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office." U.S.
Const., Art. 3, § I.
290
310 U.S. 381, 60 S. Ct. 907 (1940).
291
Id., 310 U.S. at 400.
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violating the Constitution? As far as the determination of profits is a
matter of finding facts, there would seem to be no doubt but that
finality can be conferred -upon this action of the Tax Court. When
finality may be given to administrative determinations depends upon
circumstances. Apart from the circumstances of a given case due process
has no fixed definition. The Court has steadfastly refused to make this
principle rigid. What is due process depends upon the situation at hand,
the nature of the rights affected, the end to be served and the reasonableness· of the methods selected. As the business of government has
become more complex Congress has turned to administrative agencies
for the conduct of a large segment of governmental functions. This is
true especially in the regulatory fields of utilities,292 trade practices,
taxation, labor disputes and business enterprises. It has become increasingly apparent that many administrative agencies are better qualified
than courts to deal with these regulatory problems because of the especial skill, technique, and expert knowledge required to deal with them,
and the courts have recognized this.293 They have seen, moreover, that
uniformity of regulations and the avoidance of confusion and discr.imination which might arise through conflicting decisions of courts as
to the fairness of rates, as to pricing regulations or trade practices, can
best be avoided by permitting certain questions to be finally decided by
administrative processes and to maintain an orderly procedure in the
decision of these questions has caused them to uphold the legislative instructions as to finality of administrative determination. 29 ¼ This led to a
judicial self-limitation in many instances even in the absence or in the
face of statutory expression.296 Thus, the primary jurisdiction for deciding regulatory matters has devolved upon administrative bodies.296
These factors caused the Supreme Court to decide that there was no
denial of procedural due process when there was conferred upon an
292
While the analogy of renegotiation to utilio/ rate-making is unsatisfactory,
procedurally these two types of regulation offer sounder bases for comparison.
293
See Great Northern Ry. v. Merchants' Elevator Co., 259 U.S. 285 at 291,
42 S. Ct. 477 (1922); Landis, "Significance of Administrative Commissions in the
Growth of the Law," 12 IND. L. J. 471 (1937).
29
"' Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 2II U.S. 210, 29 S. Ct. 67 (1908).
295
Texas & Pacific Ry. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426, 27 S. Ct. 350
(1907); Board of Railway Commissioners v. Great Northern Railway, 381 U.S. 412,
50 S. Ct. 391 (1930).
296
Id., 261 U.S. 412; Anniston Mfg. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 337, 57 S. Ct.
816 (1937); Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 58 S. Ct. 459
(193_8).
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administrative body power to make final determinations of fact under a
statute which allowed a judicial review of the facts only in the case of
"lack of jurisdiction, or fraud, or wilful misconduct on the part of the
members of the Board." 297
It must surely be understood that the Constitution does not guarantee to litigants the right to resort to the courts for an adjudication of
all questions. Due process is not necessarily judicial process. 298 Congress may entrust to administrative agencies the final authority to determine value. This is true even in those cases where the constitutionality of the taking depends upon the value of the property or income.299
Due process is not denied in condemnation proceedings and related
cases where' a board or a commission's findings of fact are made final and
a statute permits a judicial review only in the event of "lack of jurisdiction, or fraud, or wilful misconduct on the part of the members of the
Board." 300
Determinations of the Board of Tax Appeals, now the Tax Court,
are given finality with regard to the determination of facts regarding
income. The statute establishing the Board of Tax Appeals limited
judicial inquiry of a decision made by that agency to the question of
"whether the correct rule of law was applied to the facts found; and
whether there was substantial evideqce before the Board to support the
findings made." 301 There is no transgression of due process when the
finality of valuations under the Tariff Acts is made by appraisers. 302
And by like token, finality may within the limits of due process be given
297

Crane v. Hahlo, 258 U.S. 142 at 148, 42 S. Ct. 214 (19221.
Reetz v. Michigan, 188 U.S. 505 at 507, 23 S. Ct. 390 (1903); Ex Parte
Wall, 107 U.S. 265 at 289, 2 S. Ct. 569 (1882).
299
"By the Constitution of the United States, the estimate of the just compensation for property taken for the public use, under the right of eminent domain, is not
required to be made by a jury; but may be entrusted by Congress to commissioners
appointed by a court or by the executive, or to an inquest consisting of more or fewer
men than an ordinary jury." Bauman v. Ross, 167 U.S. 548 at 593, 17 S. Ct. 966
(1897).
30
° Crane v. Hahlo, 258 U.S. 142 at 148 (1922); see United States v. Jones,
109 U.S. 513 at 519, 3 S. Ct. 346 (1883); Backus v. Fort Street Union Depot
Company, 169 U.S. 557 at 569, 18 S. Ct. 445 (1898).
301
Helvering v. Rankin, 295 U.S. 123 at 131, 55 S. Ct. 732 (1935): Old Mission Portland Cement Company v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 289 at 294, 55 S. Ct. 158
(1934).
302
Hilton v. Merritt, 1 IO U.S. 97 at 107, 3 S. Ct. 548 ( 1884); Passavant v.
United States, 148 U.S. 214 at 219, 13 S. Ct. 572 (1893).
298
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to the determinations of appraisers as to fire loss and values.303 Likewise, determi~ations of value may be given finality for the purpose of
ad valorum taxation under a statute giving little opportunity for a
hearing. 304
Congress has, without violating due process, given executive officers
the power to enforce penalties without invqking judicial power. As an
example, the collector of customs, under section 9 of the Immigration
Act of March 3, 1903,305 imposed a fine upon a transportation company
for violating the part of the act which made it unlawful and punishable
by fine to bring any diseased alien into the United States. Authority
was conferred upon the secretary of the treasury to impose the fine
when in his judgment the disease might have been detected by competent medical examination. 306
,A similar situation arose in the case of United States v. JuToy ao,'
under the Alien Immigration and Expulsion Law 808 which made the
finding of certain executive officers of the Government upon questions
of citizenshjp 'and other questions of fact, final and conclusive in the
absence of abuse of discretion.
•
In the recent case of Falbo v. United-States,3° 9 the Court was confronted with the question of whether due process had been provided
by the Selective Training & Service Act which states that "the decisions
of such local boards shall be final' except where an appeal is authorized
in accordance with such rules and regulations as the President may
prescribe. 310
The defendant was convicted for refusing to obey his draft board's
order to report for induction. He had previously been classified as a
conscientious objector and was to have been placed upon work selected
for such persons during the war. The defendant contended at the trial
that the merits of his classification should be tried de novo and also
303
Hardware Dealers Mutual Fire Insurance Company v. Glidden Co., 284 U.S.
151, 52 S. Ct. 69 (1931).
304
State Rule Tax cases, 92 U.S. 575 at 610 (1875); Kentucky Railroad Tax
cases, II5 U.S. 321, 6 S. Ct. 57 (1885); King v. Mullins, 171 U.S. 404 at 429-431,
18 -S. Ct. 925 (1898).
305
32 Stat. L. 1213' at 1215.
306
Oceanic Steam Navigation Company v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320, 29 S. Ct.
671 (1909).
307
198 U.S. 253, 25 S. Ct. 644 (1905).
308
Act of August l 8, l 894, c. 301, § 1, 28 Stat. L. 372 at 390.
309
320 U.S. 549, 64 S. Ct. 346 (1944).
310
54 Stat. L. 893 (1940), 50 U.S.C. (1940) App. § 310(a) (2).
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that the local board had been prejudicial and arbitrary in refusing to
classify him as a minister of religion. A conviction resulted and the trial
court held that these allegations did not constitute a defense. The
circuit court of appeals affirmed the conviction and the Supreme Court
decided, in upholding the conviction, that since the defendant was under
a statutory duty to obey the draft board's order his allegations as to the
impropriety of the board's action constituted no defense. It would appear then that where Congress provides an opportunity to be heard and
gives to the board the obligation of making determinations under a
statute such as this, the administrative remedy may be made exclusive.811
No better summarization of the concepts of procedural due process
can be found than those set forth by Mr. Justice Brandeis in his concurring opinion in St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States :812
"These cases show that in deciding when, and to what extent,
finality may be given to an administrative finding of fact invohcing
the taking of property, the Court has refused to be governed by a
rigid rule. It has weighed the relative values of constitutional
rights, the essentials of powers conferred, and the need of protecting both. It has noted the distinction between informal, summary
administrative action based on ex parte casual inspection or unveri1

811 Drumheller v. Berks County Local Board, (C.C.A. 3d, 1942) 130 F. (2d)
610. Cf. Switchmen's Union of North America v. National Mediation Board, 320
U.S. 297, 64 S. Ct. 95 (1943) and see Sunshine Anthracite Coal Company v. Adkins,
310 U.S. 381 at 404, 60 S. Ct. 907 (1940).
Mr. Justice Brandeis, in reviewing the requirement of procedural due process in
his concurring opinion in St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38
· at 77-82, 56 S. Ct. 720 (1936), said:
". • • The second distinction is between the right to liberty of person and other
constitutional rights. Compare Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589, 596-597. A
citizen who claims that his liberty is being infringed is entitled, upon habeas corpus,
to the opportunity· of a judicial determination of the facts. And, so highly is this
liberty prized, that the opportunity must be accorded to any resident of the United
States who claims to be a citizen. Compare Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 282285, with United States v. JuToy, 198 U.S. 253 and Tang Tun v. Edsell, 223 U.S.
673, 675. But a multitude of decisions tells us that when dealing with property o much
more liberal rule applies. They show that due process of law does not always entitle
an owner to have the correctness of findings of fact reviewed by o court; and that m
decidmg whether such review is required, 'respect must be had to the cause and object
of the taking, whether under the taxing power, the power of eminent domain, or the
power of assessmen~ for local improvements, or none of these: and if found suitable or
admissible in the special case, it will be adjudged to be "due process of law."' Mr.
Justice Bradley, in DO'llidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97, 107." (Italics supplied.)
812
298 U.S: 38 at 81 (1936).
1
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:fied information, where no record is preserved of the evidence on
which the official acted, and formal, deliberate quasi-judicial decisions of administrative tribunals based on findings of fact expressed
in writing, and made after heari.q.g evidence and argument under
the sanctions and the safeguards attending judicial proceedings.
It has considered the nature of the facts in issue, the character of
the relevant evidence, the need in the business of Government for
prompt final decision. It has recognized that there is a limit to the
capacity of judges; and that the magnitude of the task imposed
upon them, if there be granted judicial review of the correctness
of findings of such facts as value and income, may prevent prompt
and faithful performance. It has borne in mind that even in judicial proceedings the finding of facts is left, by the Constitution,
in large part to laymen. It has enquired into the character of the
administrative tribunal provided and the incidents of its procedure.
Compare Hu_mphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602,
628. And where that prescribed for the particular class of takings
appeared 'appropriate to the case; and just to the parties to be affected,' and 'adapted to the end to be attained,' Hager v. Reclamation District, II r U.S. 7or, 708, the Court has held it constitutional to make the findings of fact of the administrative tribunal
conclusive. Thus, the Court has followed the rule of reason."
What then of the Renegotiation Act in conferring .exclusive jurisdiction for a :final determination upon the Tax Court? The determination of excessive profits involves matters of complicated business judgment, cost accounting, skilled technical study and demands as uniform
procedure and result as is possible to achieve. It appears quite clearly
that this determination is a matter especially suited to decision by an
administrative agency. Indeed, even if Congress had not made such·
determinations :final and had not given exclusive jurisdiction for making them to the the Tax Court, it is highly doubtful whether the courts
would undertake a judicial review of such :findings in view of the
virile doctrine of judicial self-limitation in such instances. 313 A case
313

lndeed, there is some question as to the value of a judicial review upon the
determination even if one were possible. The Emergency Price Control Act, upheld
as constitutional in Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503 (1944), provides for a
judicial review but in his dissenting opinion Mr. Justice Roberts observed at 541:
"But it is said the Administrator's powers are not absolute, for the statute provides
judicial review of his action. While the Act purports to give relief from rulings of the
Administrator by appeal to the Emergency Court of Appeals and to this court, the
grant of judicial review is illusory. How can any court say that the Administrator has
erred in the exercise of his judgment in determining what are defense activities? How
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in point is Railroad Co'f}'Jlf}1,ission of Texas v. Rowan and Nichols Oil
Company. 314 There an order of the Railroad Commission of Texas
with which authority for regulating oil production had been placed by
that state had made a regulatory order with regard to limiting and
pro-rating production of oil fields. This order was attacked by the oil
company as a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment on the ground
that it constituted the taking of property without due process of law.
After discussing the complexity of the problem involved, the requirement for special study and skilled technical knowledge to determine
the effect and extent of the board's order, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, who
rendered the opinion for the Court, said:815
"Plainly these are not issues for our arbitrament. The state
was confronted wit4 its general problem of proration and with the
special relation to it of the small tracts in the particular configuration of the East Texas field. It has chosen to meet these problems
through the day-to-day exertions of a body specially entrusted
with the task because presumably competent to deal with it. In
striking the balances that have to be struck with the complicated
and subtle factors that must enter into such judgments, the Commission has observed established procedure: If the history of proration is any guide, the present order is but one rp.ore item in a continuous series of adjustments. It is not for the federal courts to
supplant the Commission's judgment even in the face of convincing proof that a different result would have been better."
When Congress placed with the Tax Court exclusive authority
to review determinations of excessive profits and conferred upon it final
jurisdiction with regard to such determinations it made no further expression or provision for a judicial consideration of any of the renegotiation proceedings. What is the effect of this congressional silence?
Did Congress mean to bar from the courts all or any consideration of
renegotiation whether with regard to questions of law, questions of
jurisdiction or the manner in which the proceeedings had been concan any court pronounce that the Administrator's judgment is erroneous in defining a
'defense-rental area'? What are the materials on which to review the judgment of the
Administrator that one or another period in the last three years reflects, in a given
area, no abnormal, speculative, or unwarranted increase in rent in particular defense
housing accommodations in a chosen defense-rental area? It is manifest that it is beyond
the competence of any court to convict the Administrator of error when the supposed
materials for judgment are so vague and so numerous as those permitted by the statute."
314

a15

310 U.S. 573 (1940).
Id. at 583.
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ducted? Is the failure to provide' for any such scrutiny by the courts
to be taken as an attempted prohibition of judicial inquiry irrespective
of the question involved? And, if this is the proper construction of the
statute,_can Congress under the circumstances of renegotiation properly
forbid judicial inquiry of what are usually regarded as justiciable
issues?
It is possible that congressional failure to provide a means for resorting to the courts was intended to bar further inquiry of any nature.
A review of the committee reports and the hearings on the Revenue
Bill of r943, however, does not support such a conclusion, and reveals
that when Congress conferred final jurisdiction for determining ex-cessive profits upon the Tax Court, it did not intend an outright halt of
judicial inquiry of what may appear to be proper issues for the courts.
In fact, as the Revenue Bill of r943 was reported by the Senate Committee on Finance, it contained a provision for resort to the Court of
Claims.316 One of the reasons given for establishing the Court of
Claims as the reviewing agency in this bill .was to make available a
judicial review. 817 The house bill, however, permitted an aggrieved
contractor to ask for a redetermination of excessive profits with the Tax
Court.818 The house provision prevailed but it w~s adopted not upon
the ground that Congress desired to prohibit resort to the courts, but
rather because Congress believed that the Tax Court because of its
nature, its familiarity with costs and problems of taxation which are
related to renegotiation as well as general business problems, was a
better qualified agency to review and redetermine excessive profits than
is the Court of Claims. Convenience to place of performance of contracts because of the Tax Court's sitting in its various divisions all over
the country was also a consideration.819 But the Tax Court does not
316

Subsection (e) (1) and (2) of the Revenue Bill 1943 (H.R. 3687) as reported by Senate Committee on Finance. S. Rep. No. 627 to accompany H.R. 3687,
the Revenue Bill of 194-3, 78th Cong., 1st sess., December 22, 1943, at pp. 34 and
109 (Committee on Finance).
317
The Report of the Senate Committee on Finance Said: "Review by the Tax
Court would constitute merely a further administrative review and therefore, in the
opinion of the committee, would se!ve no useful purpose." Id. at p. 109.
318
Subsections (e) (1) and (2) of the Revenue Bill 1943 (H.R. 3687) as introduced in the House November 18, 1943 by Representative Doughton.
819
"The Tax Court of the United States is peculiarly fitted to determine what is
fair price and' what is fair profit, having long been engaged in the determination of
similar questions and being thoroughly equipped for this purpose.
"Moreover a determination before The Tax Court will be of great convenience
to contractors or subcontractors
reason of the fact that the Board sits through its
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seem to have been selected with a view to barring a judicial review of
justiciable issues. Congress was· advised that there was grave doubt as
to whether resort to the courts on questions of a mistake of law, fraud,
or misconduct in the proceedings could be constitutionally denied to the
courts. 820 In other words, Congress was told that it probably could not
prohibit a contractor's right to contest procedural due process.821 It
appears, moreover, that there was no desire to institute such a bar. 822
It can be argued that, since Congress had before it the choice of providing a judicial review through selecting the Court of Claims as the
reviewing agency or attaching finality to an administrative review with
the Tax Court, Congress, having chosen to place final determining authority with an administrative and not a judicial body, thereby showed
an intent to cut off judicial review. The chief difficulty with this argudivisions in various localities all over the United States. Thus it will not be necessary
for an aggrieved contractor to come to Washington to obtain a determination by the
Tax-Court." H. Rep. No. 871, to accompany H.R. 3687, 78th Cong., 1st sess.,
November 18, 1943, p. 77 (Committee on Ways and Means).
The Treasury and the Department of Justice as well as the War-Department
strongly urged that the Tax Court should not be the agency for review for the reason
of its heavy load of tax cases which might make expeditious settlement of renegotiation
matters impossible as well as that, since the Tax Court is an administrative agency,
resort to it did not provide a judicial review. See: S. Rep. No. 627, 78th Cong., 1st
sess., December 22, 1943 at pp. 34 and xo9 (Committee on Finance).
820
See: Statements of the Undersecretary of War Patterson and Mr. Joseph
Dodge, Chairman of the War Contracts Price Adjustment Board in S. Hearings on
H.R. 3687, 78th Cong., 1st sess., Part 7, December 6, 1943, at pp. 987-xoo7, lOI2xo17, 1064-1083 (Committee on Finance). The undersecretary said at p. 1017:
"With respect to the scope of review, I agree with the position of the Department
of Justice, as expressed to the joint board, that it would be helpful if determinations
of the secretaries of the departments or of the proposed War Contracts Price Adjustment Board should be final and conclusive exceP.t to the extent that the contractor can
establish ( on the basis of the record made by the contractor in the court review proceeding) that the determination was the result of a mistake of law, fraud, arbitrary or
capricious action, or was so grossly erroneous as to imply bad faith.
"This proceeding would afford protection to a contractor who could show that
he had been arbitrarily or unfairly treated and at the same time would give due weight
to the determinations of the departments and avoid possible danger of overburdening
the courts with a large volume of difficult and burdensome cases."
821
Statement of Francis M. Shea, Assistant Attorney General. Id., pp. xo32-1050.
822
In testifying before the Senate Committee on Finance upon the issue of
whether the contractor should be permitted to seek a review with the Tax Court or
the Court of Claims, the Undersecretary of War, Robert P. Patterson, said:·
"I have repeatedl,:- stated that I have no objection to the making of some statutory
provision for judicial review, and, in fact, have expressed the opinion that there is
such right of review under existing law." Statement of Undersecretary of War Patterson, id. at p. IO l 6.
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ment is that the point before Congress was whether the determination
of the board or secretary should be scrutinized or redetermined and not
whether other issues of a justiciable nature such as those mentioned
above might be litigated. 323 Although the determination of excessive
profits, involving as it does especial skill and technique, seems to be a
problem, which may be exclusively reserved for an administrative
agency, one can only reluctantly reach a conclusion that the act may be
constitutionally interpreted to bar a judicial consideration of questions
of law and misconduct of proceedings. The circumstances here do not
reasonably require such a result. To the contrary, they seem to admit of
the conclusion that the contractor must be permitted access to the courts.
In American School of Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty, 324 the
postmaster general had issued a fraud order to bar certain of the
plaintiff's letters from the mails under a statute which provides no
judicial review. Suit for injunction was then brought to prevent enforcement of the order. The statute permitted the postmaster general
to exclude matter from the mails when in hii opinion "upon evidence
satisfactory to him [it appeared] that any person" was engaged "in
conducting any fraudulent lottery, gift-enterprise, or scheme for the
distribution of money" by use of the mails.325 In the trial court the defendant demurred and obtained judgment upon the demurrer. The
Supreme Court reversed that judgment and decided that, although
Congress has the full and absolute control over the mails, and the determination by the postmaster general upon the basis of the statute is
conclusive in character, nonetheless, the courts have the power to grant
relief through an injunction where the administrative office has assumed to act and exercise authority under a mistake of law. The determination of the postmaster general was held to be no defense where
there was a mistake of law. The Court said through Mr. Justice Peckham: 32s
"Here it is contended that the Postmaster General has, in a
case not covered by the acts of Congress, excluded from the mails
letters addressed to the complainants. His right to exclude letters,
or to refuse to permit their delivery to persons addressed, must de328
See: H. Rep. 871, 78th Cong., 1st sess., November 18, 1943, at pp. 76-77
(Committee on Ways and Means).
324
187 U.S. 94, 23 S. Ct. 33 (1902).
325
Section 3929 of the U.S. Rev. Stat. (1878).
326
American School of Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty, 187 U.S. 94 at 109
(1902).
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pend upon some law of Congress, and if no such law exists, then he
cannot exclude or refuse to deliver them. Conceding, arguendo,
that when a question of fact arises, which, if found in one way,
would show a violation of the statutes in question in some particular, the decision of the Postmaster General that such violation had
occurred, based upon some evidence to that effect, would be conclusive and final, and not be the subject of review by any court,
yet to that assumption must be added the ~tatement that if the
evidence before the Postmaster General, in any view of the facts,
failed to show a violation of any Federal law, the determination of
that official that such a violation existed would not be the determination of a question of fact, but a pure mistake of law on his
part, because of the facts being conceded, whether they amounted
to a violation of the statutes, would be a legal question and not a
question of fact. Being a question of law simply, and the case
stated in the bill being outside of the statutes, the result is that the
postmaster general has ordered the retention of letters directed
to complainants in a case not authorized by those statutes. To
authorize the interference of the postmaster general, the facts
stated must in some aspect be sufficient to permit him under the
statute to make the order.
"The facts, which are here admitted of record, show that the
case is not one which by any construction of those facts is covered
or provided for by the statutes under which the Postmaster General has assumed to act, and his determination that those admitted
facts do authorize his action is a clear mistake of law as applied to
the admitted facts, and the courts, therefore, must have power in
a proper proceeding to grant relief. Otherwise, the individual is
left to the absolute uncontrolled and arbitrary action of a public
and administrative officer, whose action is unauthorized by law
and is in violation of the rights of the individual. Where the action of such an officer is thus u,nauthorized he thereby violates the
property rights of the person whose letters are withheld." (Italics
supplied.) 327
Although the arguments for a given statutory_ construction based
upon avoiding a meaning which would give an unconstitutional result 828 and of shunning constitutional issues where it is not necessary
827
Accord: Public Clearing House v. Coyne, 194 U.S. 497, 24 S. Ct. 789
(1904); Buttfi.eld v. Stranahan, 192 U.S. 470, 24 S. Ct. 349 (1904); United States
v. JuToy, 198 U.S. 253 (1904).
828
See note 222 supra.
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to face them 829 are frequently fraught with the fraility of assuming the
point at issue, there is such grave doubt as to the constitutionality of
the Renegotiation Act were it to be construed as to prohibit a judicial
inquiry of questions of law and questions of misconduct in procedure,
that such arguments cannot be ignored in the consideration of this problem. It is not the intention here, however, to leave the_ impression that
Congress is without power under certain conditions to completely deny
judicial inquiry and that it cannot make administrative determinations
final and beyond the reach of the courts. The draft cases, F alba v.
United States 830 and Drumheller v. Berks County Local Board,381 mentioned earlier in this discussion, and those cases closely akin involving
court martial 382 are illustrative of this point. But the Fa(bo Case goes
off on the ground that to permit a judicial review would interfere with
an orderly flow of men into the armed forces which is demanded for
reasons of the nation's security,333 and the court martial cases are rested
upon the traditions of military discipline which were prevalent at the
time the Constitution was adopted. But these cases are hardly criteria
for deciding the problem at hand. Their circumstances differ widely
from those of renegotiation. That Congress may make final and conclusive the Tax Court's determinations of excessive profits, seems beyond serious question. But issues arising out of these proceedings which
are in the nature of mistakes of law or occur because of alleged misconduct and are ordinarily considered to ~e justiciable in administration
matters do not seem to be attended in renegotiation with conditions that
require t~em to be placed beyond the pale of judicial exploration.
Procedure
The procedure by which a contractor may bring justiciable issues
before the courts is outside the scope of this paper. Nevertheless,
without undertaking to show their solution, it will be well to point
out a few of the procedural problems which will be encountered by any
contractor who finds .necessary a judicial contest. Since the Renegotia829

See note 223 supra. .
320 U.S. 549 (1944).
881
(C.C.A. 3d, 1942) 130 F. (2d) 610.
832
"What is due proc;:ess of law must be determined by circumstances. To those in
the military or naval service of the United States the military law is due process. The
decision,· therefore, of a military tribunal acting within the scope of its powers cannot
be reviewed or set aside by the [ civil] courts." McKenna, J., in Reaves v. Ainsworth,
219 U.S. 296.at 304, 31 S. Ct. 230 (1911).
888
57 HARV. L. REV. 577 (1944).
330
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tion Act prescribes no method for reaching the courts, a collateral proceeding is necessary for obtaining an adjudication. An action on the
contract in the Court of Claims under the Tucker Act m for the full
contract price is one means of presenting those issues to the courts. A
suit for an injunction or an action for declaratory judgment 885 may
achieve the result. A writ of prohibition or mandamus, however, can
not be used to contest the constitutionality of the Renegotiation Act as
an original action in the Supreme Court.886 If the contractor seeks an
injunction or a declaratory judgment, such suit must be against officers
of the Government because of the principles of sovereign immunity.887
In these cases the contractor should be prepared to answer the contention that the suit is in fact one against the United States since the
officer is being sued in his official capacity and it is therefore not maintainable because the sovereign has not consented to be sued. The
United States District Court for the District of Columbia holding a
three-judge statutory court recently decided on motion for summary
judgment that suit to restrain a secretary from enforcing a determination of excessive profits in renegotiation was a suit against the official
and not against the United States.888
884

Act of March 3, 1887, 24 Stat. L. 505.
48 Stat. L. 955 (1934), 28 U.S.C. (1934) § 400, as amended by 49 Stat. L.
1014 at 1027 (1935), 28 U.S.C. (Supp. 1937) § 400.
886
Ex parte Alliance Brass & Bronze Company, 320 U.S. 719, 64 S. Ct. 367
(1944); Rolls Royce, Inc. v. Stimson, (U.S. May 22, 1944) 64 S. Ct. u47.
887
See: 3 WILLOUGHBY, THE CoNSTITUTIONAL LAw OF THE UNITED STATES, 2d
ed., § 887 (1929); Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S. Ct. 441 (1908); Electric
Bond & Share Company v. Securities & Exchange Commission, 303 U.S. 419, 58 S. Ct.
678 (1938).
888
Lincoln Electric Company v. Frank Knox and James V. Forrestal, 13 U. S.
LAW WEEK., 2076 (1944). This case will be argued upon the merits which directly
involve the constitutionality of the Renegotiation Act at an indefinite date which
will probably be the latter part of November or early in December. Cf. New
Electric Company v. Frank Knox and James V. Forrestal, Civil Action No. 21,866 in
the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. Case argued June 27,
I 944. The Government's brief in support of the argument that such suit is against the
United States as the sovereign and hence not permissible, cites: Minnesota v. Hitchcock,
185 U.S. 373 at 386, 22 S. Ct. 650 (1902); Louisiana v. McAdoo, 234 U.S. 627 at
629, 34 S. Ct. 938 (1914); Worchester County Trust Company v. Riley, 302 U.S.
292 at 296, 58 S. Ct. 185 (1938). Cited by the plaintiff as being contra: Philadelphia
Co. v. Stimson, 223 U.S. 605 at 619-620, 32 S. Ct. 340 (1912); Ickes v. Fox, 300
U.S. 82 at 97, 57 S. Ct. 412 (1937); Kennington v. Palmer, 255 U.S. 100, 41 S. Ct.
303 (1921); Colorado v. Toll, 268 U.S. 228 at 230, 45 S Ct. 505 (1925); United
States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, I S. Ct. 240 (1882); Tennessee Electric Power Co. v.
Tennessee Valley Authority, 306 U.S. 118 at 137, 59 S. Ct. 366 (1939); Degge v.
385
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The usual thing is to require the contestant to exhaust his administrative remedies before appealing to a judicial tribunal. 339 The courts
take the position that it is desirable to decide all issues in an orderly
way. This concept is based upon the policy of eliminating all unnecessary litigation and it will best be served if disputes can be resolved in
the administrative processes. 840 Thus, the administrator is to be given
every opportunity to correct any error before the matter comes to litigation.341 Although this is the general rule there seems to be some
difference of treatment given those cases where only the constitutionality of a statute is attacked and no questions of administrative
action are raised. And the courts have accepted jurisdiction where the
object of the suit was to determine only the constitutional question and
not to challenge administrative action. 342 This, however, does not appear to be a principle of general application even in such instances.34a
That no question should be judicially considered until the administrative processes have been completed is an argument that has received
approval, for if the administrative remedy had been pursued it might
have reached a result which would have caused no damage to the
contestant.344 If the objection lies to administrative action as well as
the constitutionality of the act exhaustion of the administrative remedy
will probably be required before judicial arbitrament can be obtained.845
If the administrative remedy is to be pursued before the act's conHitchcock, 229 U.S. 162 at 171, 33 S. Ct. 639 (1913); Lane v. Watts, 234 U.S. 525
at '540, 34 S. Ct. 965 (1914); Waite v. Macy, 246 U.S. 606 at 610, 38 S. Ct. 395
(1918); Goltra v. Weeks, 271 U.S. 536 at 544, 46 S. Ct. 613 (1936); Allen v.
Regents of University System of Georgia, 304 U.S. 439 at 444, 58 S. Ct. 980 (1938);
Franklin Township v. Tugwell, (Ct. App. D. C. 1936) 85 F. (2d) 208.
339
·
Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210, 29 S. Ct. 67 (1908); P. F.
Petersen Baking Co. v. Bryan, 290 U.S. 570, 54 S. Ct. 277 (1934); Myers v. Bethlehem Ship Building Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 58 S. Ct. 459 (1938); United States v.
Sing Tuck, 194 U.S. 161, 24 S. Ct. 621 (1904).
340
Id., 194 U.S. 161.
341
See P. F. Petersen Baking Co. v. Bryan, 290 U.S. 570, 54 S. Ct. 277 (1934).
342
Euclid, Ohio, Village of, v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1927).
343
Cf. Newport News Ship Building & Drydock Co. v. Schauffier, 303 U.S. 54,
58 S. Ct. 466 (1938).
844
Cf. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 56 S. Ct. 855 (1936). See
Electric Bond & Share Co. v. Securities & Exchange Commission, 303 U.S. 419, 58
S. Ct. 678 (1938).
345
The problem of exhausting administrative remedies is dealt with similarly in
those cases where a declaratory judgment is sought as in the instances where the prayer is for an injunction. Newport News Ship Building & Drydock Co. v. Schauffier, 303
U.S. 54 (1938). On the guestion of declaratory judgment in constitutional limitation
see a note in 51 HARV. L. REv. 1267 (1938).
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stitutionality is questioned, there is another issue, though of less importance, which ought not to be overlooked. Is the contractor estopped
from contesting the constitutionality of the statute· after having followed and submitted to its administrative procedures? Cappelini 'V.
Commissioner 846 subscribes to this idea. There a deficiency had been
assessed against the taxpayer, Cappelini. He undertook to contest the
constitutionality of the statute and filed his complaint with the Board
of Tax Appeals. The board refused to consider the constitutional question saying, it is "only by invoking the provisions of section 280 thai:
petitioner may come to the Board, for it is that section alone which
gives the board jurisdiction of these proceedings. It is a well settled
principle that one cannot invoke the aid of a statute conferring jurisdiction and at the same time attack the validity of the statute so
invoked." 347 But there is considerable doubt as to the soundness of
such a principle and the Cappelini case received unfavorable comment
in Routzahn 'V. Tyroler 848 where the court said:
"True, the contrary inference would follow, from the opinion
of the majority of the Board in the Cappelini Case, I4 B.T.A.
r269, but we cannot agree that any estoppel arises, as the Board
there thought. To say that an act may impose an unconstitutional
liability and forbid all judicial review except in one way, and then
that one who appeals for review in the way provided for him
thereby estops himself to deny the validity of the imposition, is,
to our minds, an obvious solecism." 349
CONCLUDING REMARKS

Renegotiation appears to have now reached the point where further
legislative changes of a major character are unlikely. The assault upon
the act seems to have spent itself in the amendments which the Revenue
Act of r943 brought forth. Moreover, the urgency of any further
changes which might be proposed may well be dissipated by the fact
that the renegotiation will certainly terminate by July I, r945 if extended by the President and even sooner if he does not exercise this
authority.
.
The cases pending before the courts will eventually bring a decision
on the act's constitutionality. The weight of the war as creating the
346

14 B. T. A. 1269 (1929).
Id. at 1272.
m (C.C.A. 6th, 1929) 36 F. (2d) 208.
849
Id. at 209.
347
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urgent necessity for renegotiation will bear enormous effect in this
consideration. The ability of the Government to conduct its affairs
through administrative agencies must be recognized as being of even
- greater importance in tirp.e of war than under other conditions. The
trend is not away from upholding statutes for the regulation of business-to the contrary. And, the regulation of war prices and profits
which stem from contracts for the manufacture and sale of the implements of war are an extension of these principles which the circumstances of these times may be found to justify.

